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Abstract. Armed Criminal group is one of the problems faced by many countries in the world. Awful behaviour of armed
criminal group members can affect a large amount of people. In this paper, we construct a deterministic mathematical model
that takes into account persuasive and repressive intervention. We consider crime as a social epidemic. We determine the
armed criminal group free equilibrium point and the armed criminal group persistence equilibrium point together with their
existence condition. The next generation matrix is used to obtain the basic reproduction number. The local stability
conditions of equilibrium points are proved using linearization. We show that the armed criminal group free equilibrium
point is globally asymptotically stable under certain condition. Numerical simulations are performed to support our
deductive study.
Keywords:armed criminal group, deterministic model, stability analysis , next generation matrix,
I. INTRODUCTION
Organised crime has a deletrious impact on many
countries around the world [1]. They frequently pose
serious problems, particularly in urban areas [2]. Armed
group, at its most basic level, is an organized group with a
clear structure, membership, and the capacity to use
aggressivenes in the occupation of its desire [3]. This
definition is very general and includes the state armed
forces e.g. the police and the army. The armed groups
discussed in this article are armed groups that commit
crimes. We call it the armed criminal group. Some
examples of armed criminal groups are the Yakuza, Triads,
drug cartel, and Mafia. They are also called criminal
organization [2].
Recently, many mathematical models have been
developed to study criminal activity dynamic [4]–[15].
Gonzalez [11] propose a mathematical model of crime by
assuming crime as a social epidemic process. The optimal
control problem of model of crime is discussed in [6]. A
mathematical model of crime that takes into consideration
serious and minor criminal activity is discussed in [15].
Jongo [12] study a mathematical model to investigate how
minor criminals turn in to major criminals inside and
outside of prisons.
Unlike the model previously described, we are specially
interested in studying the dynamics of crime caused by
individuals or groups (armed criminal groups) when there
is persuasive and repressive intervention. Pre-emitive
intervention is carried out through education or
rehabilitation. On the other hand, repressive intervention is
accomplished through punishments e.g. imprisonment.
II. Results and Discussion
2.1 Model Formulation
We assume that the human population is divided into
four disjoint subpopulations. , , ,i gP C C Q represent
susceptible human, criminals who commit a crime
individually, criminals who commit a crime in groups, and
humans who choose not to be a criminal, respectively. We
assume that recruitment rate of human ( ) is constant.
Susceptible humans ( )P can become criminals due to
interactions with criminals ( )gC . The effective contact rate
between P and gC is denoted  . P reduces because of
natural death at rate  . Susceptible humans who have
received education about criminal act can supress their
desire to commit a crime. The proportion of susceptible
humans who receive education and the effectivity of
education implementation are denoted  and  ,
respectively. Based on these assumptions, we get
.dP PM P P
dt
       (1)
The criminals who commit a crime individually increase
because of the new criminals i.e. susceptible humans who
are influenced by criminals. After committing several
crimes individually, the criminals will decide whether they
continue or stop doing crimes. We assume that someone
who prefer doing crime will commit a crime in group. On
the other hand, someone who prefer to stop doing a crime
because of education or other factors go to Q compartment.
Sometimes, a criminals are killed due to their crimes.
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Therefore, we consider using crime induced death rate x .




         (2)
The criminals who commit a crime in group increase
because of criminals who usually commit a crime
individually join the group. Similar to O compartment, we
assume that criminals who commit crimes in group can be
killed due to their crimes and can stop doing a crime at rate
 . Hence, we get
  ,xdM O M       (3)
   1 .dQ O M Q P O
dt
          (4)
 is the proportion of O who go to M compartment.
2.2 Basic Properties
Theorem 1. Solutions of system (-) with non-negative
initial value are always non-negative.
Proof.
Regard as  ( ) min ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )G t P t O t M t Q t . Its clear that
(0) 0G  . Suppose that there is *t such that ( ) 0G t  for
*[0, )t t , *( ) 0G t  , and ( ) 0G t  for *t t  . Assume that
( ) ( )G t P t , from equation , we obtain
*
* * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0.
dP t P t M P t P t
dt




Its clear that ( ) 0P t  for *t t  which leads to a
contradiction. Thus, ( )P t is always non-negative for 0t  . By
similar method, we can show that ( ), ( ), ( )O t M t Q t are non-
negative for 0t  .
Therorem 2. Solutions of system (-) are bounded
Proof. Let N is the total number of human. Hence,
N P O M Q    and
.dN dP dO dM dQ
dt dt dt dt dt
    (6)









    
  
(7)
Hence, a standard comparison argument provides






This indicates that the solutions of the system are bounded
for 0t  . Based on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we obtain
feasible region of the system as follows.
 , , , | 0 , 0,, 0, 0, 0P O M Q P O M Q P O M Q

 
           
 
2.3 Equilibrium points and the basic reproduction number
The armed criminal group free equilibrium point is
 * * * *0 , , , ,0,0,0P O M Q  
 
     
. 0 is always exists in
4
 .
The armed criminal group persistence equilibrium point
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      

    
   

 
It is clear that 1 exists in 4 if 0 1R  .
The basic reproduction number is determined by using
next generation matrix. From , and 0 , we get
   
1
0 ( ) .
x x
R FV  
        
  
     
2.3 Stability of the armed criminal group free equilibrium
points
Theorem 3. Armed criminal group free equilibrium
point 0 is locally asymptotically stable if 0 1R  and
unstable if 0 1R  .
Proof.We will prove this theorem by using linearization















   
     
   
     
    
         
     
(8)

















    
   
     
   
 
          






. The eigen values of  0J  are the
roots of characteristics polynomial
  








     
  
     
where
       







x x x x
H P
P
           
                 
          
                
It is easy to see that  H  has two negative roots i.e.
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1   and  2     . The other eigenvalues are roots
of  1H  . Based on Descartes’ sign rule,  1H  has no
positive roots if    * 0x x P               . It
is clear that this condition is met if 0 1R  . Moreover, one
eigenvalue is positive provided
by    * 0x x P               . Hence, if 0 1R  ,
all eigenvalues of  0J  are negative ( 0 is locally
asymptotically stable). Furthermore, if 0 1R  , one
eigenvalue of  0J  is positive ( 0 is unstable).
Theorem 4. . Armed criminal group free equilibrium point
0 is globally asymptotically stable in  if 0 1R  where
 , , , | 0 , 0,, 0, 0, 0P O M Q P O M Q P O M Q

 
           
 
Proof. We will prove this theorem by using Lyapunov
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            
It is easy to see that  0 0V   and   , , , 0V P O M Q  for
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 
        
     
    
   
 
Using the fact that   *P    , we obtain
      
  
  
     
 
 
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   
  

   
  
 
   

    
    
   
 

    
 
        
 
       

       
Thus, we obtain 0dV
dt




and only if * , 0, 0, 0P P O M Q
 

    

. Hence, the





singleton set, that is, 0 . Then by Lyapunov-Lasalle
theorem, it is proved that 0 is globally asymptotically
stable provided by 0 1R  .
2.4 stability of armed criminal group persistence
equilibrium point
Theorem 5. The armed criminal group persistence
equilibrium point  ** ** ** **1 , , ,P O M Q  is locally
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Proof.We will prove this theorem by using linearization





























   
     
   
     

    
 
          
    
  
    
   
It is clear that 0iJ  for 1...9i  . The eigenvalues of  1J 
are roots of characteristics polynomial
    
       
        
   
4 4 1
1 4 6 2 5 2 3 5





J J J J J J J J
J J J J J J J J J
K
 
    
     
  
  
        
         
 
where
  3 21 1 2 3K k k k      
It is convenient to see that  K  has one negative
eigenvalue i.e. 1   . The other eigenvalues are roots



















1 1 2 3,k k k k are always positive. It is straightforward to
show that     3 0 1 x xk R                 . If
0 1R  then 3 0k  . Hence, 1 locally asymptotically stable
if 0 1R  .
2.5 Numerical simulations
We now present numerical simulations to support our
theoretical results. We performed two scheme numerical
simulations to investigate the impact of pre-emitive and
repressive intervention. To study the impact of pre-emitive,
we conduct numerical simulation with varying  . To
investigate the impact of repressive intervention, we
perform numerical simulation with varying x . We choose
the following set parameter values for illustrative purpose
only. These parameter values are selected to show the










2.5.1. Dynamics of armed criminal group without
interventions
In this part, we performed numerical simulation using
parameter value that are mentioned in Table 1 with
0  and 0x  . The reproduction number 0 8.9286 1R   .
Based on Theorem 3, the armed criminal goups persist.
Figure 1. Dynamics of armed criminal group for
0 8.9286 1R  
Figure 1 show the dynamics of armed criminal groups. It
is clear that the criminals who commit crimes individually
or in group always persist in high density all the time
eventhough some criminals quit and never commit a crime
again. This condition is certainly worrisome.
2.5.2. Impact of pre-emitive intervention only
In this part, we performed numerical simulation with
varying  and 0x  . We use 0.2,0.6,  and 0.95 . The
reproduction numbers are 4.2857,1.7007, and 0.9796. Based
on Theorem 5, the criminal compartments i.e O and
M will converge to armed criminal group persistence
equilibrium for the first and second case. On the other
hand, the criminal compartments converge to armed
criminal group free equilibrium point for the third case.
Figure 2. Dynamics of O compartment for varying 
Figure 3. Dynamics of M compartment for varying 
Figure 2-3 show that the criminals who commit crimes
individually or in groups decrease as  increases. The blue
and red curve converge to a positive equilibrium. On the
other hand, the yellow curve converge to zero. These
results indicate that the criminals persist for the first and
second case and extinct for the third case.
2.53. Impact of repressive intervention only
In this part, we performed numerical experiment with
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varying x and 0  . We use 0.2,0.6,x  and 0.95 . The
reproduction numbers are 5.5556,2.7473, and 1.7316. Based
on Theorem 5, the criminal compartments i.e O and
M will converge to armed criminal group persistence
equilibrium for all cases.
Figure 4. Dynamics of O compartment for varying x
Figure 5. Dynamics of M compartment for varying x
Figure 4-5 show that the criminals who commit crimes
individually or in groups decrease as x increases. Unlike
the previous simulation, these results indicate that the
criminals persist for all cases.
2.53. Impact of pre-emitive and repressive intervention
In this part, we performed numerical experiment with
varying x and  . We use
0.1,0.25,0.5,x  and 0.1,0.25,0.5.x  The reproduction
numbers are 4.6875,2.2083, and 0.8681. Based on Theorem
5, the criminal compartments i.e O and M will converge to
armed criminal group persistence equilibrium for the first
and secod case.
Figure 6. Dynamics of O for varying x and
Figure 7. Dynamics of M for varying x and
Figure 6-7 show that the criminals who commit crimes
individually or in groups decrease as  increases. The blue
and red curve converge to a positive equilibrium. On the
other hand, the yellow curve converge to zero. These
results indicate that the criminals persist for the first and
second case and extinct for the third case.
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